I. Introduction
Despite the significant economic and institutional progress experienced by the main economies of the region over the last decade or so, Latin America still experiences substantial macroeconomic instability. 2 Replacing the chronic domestic imbalances of the past, much of this instability stems from the occasional but sharp tightening of a country's access to international financial markets; what Guillermo Calvo has so appropriately dubbed "the sudden stop." 3 Facing this scenario, both the private as well as the public sectors are compelled to design an appropriate international liquidity management strategy. Unfortunately, while at the microeconomic level ---i.e., given prices---this is not a daunting task, there is still very limited understanding of its macroeconomic counterpart. In this paper I attempt to shed some light on this issue, drawing from some of my recent theoretical and applied work in this area. Since this is a policy conference, however, I go further and --somewhat "irresponsibly"---make a series of conjectures on the impact of international liquidity management considerations on the desirable features of macroeconomic policy. 4 3 Calvo (1998) .
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http://web.mit.edu/caball/www I develop the argument of the paper by addressing three sequential questions: (a) Why is there a need for decentralized and centralized international liquidity management? (b) What are the types of structural and macroeconomic polices that a government should pursue, even if the private sector is using the socially-efficient prices in deciding its international liquidity position? and (c) When and how should the government attempt to "force" the private sector to increase its international liquidity position?
Since the "sudden stop" problem is primarily a financial one, the analysis in this paper builds on the presence of financial frictions. While some of the latter are undoubtedly a part of the new global economy --in particular the greater flexibility and options for capital as well as the highly-leveraged nature of many of these investors -I chose to emphasize domestic weaknesses since these are probably easier to remedy and account for a substantial part of the problem. There are two of these weaknesses that are widely observed in emerging economies and play a central role in my analysis: (i) weak links with international financial markets, and (ii) underdeveloped domestic financial markets.
Together, they justify and complicate the problem of international liquidity management.
II. Why do we need an international liquidity management strategy?
The view portrayed in this paper links the answer to this question to the two financial deficiencies highlighted above. I build the story sequentially ---one ingredient at a time---as this will clarify the different nature of the policy questions asked in sections III and IV, as well as the particular deficiencies that give rise to them. Let me start with that which is most directly connected ---it is indeed a necessary ingredient---to the need for international liquidity management: Weak links with international financial markets.
Ingredient 1: Weak links with international financial markets
These are simply financial constraints, possibly time-varying, that limit the public and private international borrowing (broadly understood) of emerging countries. The evidence for this is substantial. Just to highlight a few dimensions of this problem, consider, e.g., the path of an index of sovereign spreads for Latin America's largest economies over the second half of the 90's illustrated in Figure 1 
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Note: the time series is an average of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Moreover, while less than prime corporate assets in the U.S. also suffered during the Asian and Russian crises, the rise in their premia was substantially smaller. This difference can also be appreciated over longer time intervals. American bonds pay a higher spread and their returns are substantially more volatile. 5 Moreover, the spread-premium is probably a result of this "excess volatility" that mostly comes from episodes when financial markets tighten for emerging markets. Latin $ VLPLODU SDWWHUQ DSSHDUV LQ RWKHU /DWLQ $PHULFDQ FRXQWULHV 6HH &DEDOOHUR F IRU HYLGHQFH LQ 0H[LFR American bonds look "illiquid" from the point of view of spreads and volatility, despite the fact that their volume is often much larger than that of the specific U.S. corporate bonds described in the table.
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A simple model. Connecting this ingredient to an external crisis due to international liquidity shortages is straightforward. I do this by sketching a model that is slightly richer than is needed at this point, for it explicitly considers a domestic financial market, but that will allow me to bring in the second ingredient later on with very little additional investment.
It is not too farfetched to think about an emerging economy's timeline in the terms described in Figure 2 . Date 0 corresponds to "normal" times, when investment, planning and prevention are all very relevant. A significant part of this planning has to do with anticipating and preventing a crisis in the perhaps not too distant future at date 1. 6 Date 2 represents the future, always brighter than the present, but a significant obstacle is that the country -both its sovereign as well as its corporations -often fails to persuade foreign financiers that they will share in that bright future if they help to avert the crisis (weak international financial links). Figure 3 describes the elements creating a crisis driven entirely by insufficient external resources, but with a perfectly functioning domestic financial system. We can think of a crisis as a time when, (a) a significant fraction of firms or economic agents are in need of financing to either repay debt or implement new investments needed to save high return projects, and (b) on net, the economy as a whole needs substantial external resources but does not have enough assets and commitment to obtain them. Loosely, I refer to these assets and commitment as "collateral," which needs not be interpreted literally as pledged assets but as the resources that are likely to be recouped by a lender. In order to make things as stark as possible, imagine that distressed firms have no assets of value to foreigners, but that the high date 2 return on their investment if successfully maintained, A n , is fully pledgeable to other domestic agents. To be concrete, think of A n as the value of a building (nontradeable) delivered at date 2, and assume that absent a crisis the discount of future flows is simply zero, the international discount rate. The most direct shock conducive to a fire sale and crisis is indeed a sudden loss in the international appeal of a country's assets. This can be due to country-specific factors as well as to changes and shocks in the segments of international financial markets relevant for the country. The turmoil after the Russian crisis in October 1998, as well as the debt crises that followed U.S. interest tightening during the early 1980s, are two prototypical examples of the latter. "tequila" crisis of 1995 appears to be the exception that proves the rule as the high copper price gave the Chilean economy enough "liquidity" to ride through the crisis and experience fast domestic growth despite the large international credit crunch experienced by emerging economies. 10 This is confirmed in panel (b), which demonstrates that Chile used a large fraction of the "liquidity" given by the high price of copper to offset the
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decline in capital inflows as the current account deficit at normal prices reached its highest level during that year. Most importantly, exactly the opposite occurred during the 1998-99 crisis as the price of copper plummeted (erasing Chile's liquidity) at the precise time that international financial markets tightened. 11 In order to place this scenario in the context of the model above, assume that international collateral is constituted primarily by claims on tradable goods while domestic collateral represents mostly assets issued by producers of non-tradable goods. 12 An adverse terms of trade shock is simply a decline in the value of traded goods' assets, A t , which reduces the country's borrowing capacity and shifts the supply curve to the left in a manner similar to the financial shocks above. A sufficiently large or sufficiently long sequence of terms of trade shocks can significantly reduce a country's international liquidity, causing a fire sale and corresponding real decline. Needless to say, the extent to which this is likely to happen depends critically on the tightness of external financial markets.
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Ingredient 2: Underdeveloped domestic financial markets.
Turning to the second ingredient, the development of domestic financial markets is instrumental not only in fostering investment and growth, but also in aggregating resources during distress. Underdeveloped financial markets limit the prompt reallocation of resources, creating wasteful contractions in those markets most affected by shocks or less plugged into the financial system. On the other hand, as financial development rises 13 In isolation, these canonical shocks are not always large enough to justify the observed aggregate volatility created by a crisis, and at times crises occur even without their apparent presence. These features are not in contradiction to the basic premise, for both their presence as well as a high likelihood of them becoming a factor in the near future typically suffice to trigger public and private responses with recessionary consequences. And oI FRXUVH WKHVH UHVSRQVHV PD\ LQGHHG SUHYHQW ODUJHU FULVHV LQ WKH QHDU IXWXUH ,·OO UHWXUQ WR WKLV GLVFXVVLRQ LQ WKH SROLF\ VHFWLRQV so does leverage, and with it the vulnerability of the financial system to shocks also increases. Many Latin American economies have suffered at both ends: chronic financial repression and underdevelopment and, when moving away from that, large collapse of the banking system.
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Most significantly for the purpose at hand, however, it is this domestic underdevelopment that naturally creates externalities that justify macroeconomic policies aimed at changing the private sector's international liquidity management (as opposed to measures aimed simply to increase the private sector's access to international liquidity). It is this point that I develop here, after briefly documenting the underdevelopment of most Latin American financial markets. For the latter, consider two basic features of these markets:
their limited size and their illiquidity. We can now return to the model and enrich it to consider financial underdevelopment.
The central point to be drawn from this extension is that unlike the case where only ingredient 1 is present, domestic providers of international liquidity are not transferred all of the surplus during crises, and hence they are not given the right incentives to supply this liquidity. When domestic financial markets are imperfect in the sense that distressed firms without direct access to international financial markets do not have the means to fully pledge their returns to other domestics or informed investors, the ex-ante incentive to hoard and supply international liquidity is weakened. Market-making is not a great business in a market with constrained demands. Imperfect domestic financial markets are Panel (a) in Figure 8 illustrates the scenario just described. Given the date 0 allocations, a decline in λ n reduces the effective demand for international liquidity. While the marginal product curve remains unchanged (dashed line), the effective demand curve (solid line)
shifts down as the maximum payment per unit of investment is only λ n A n. As long as pledgeable assets are greater than the opportunity cost of funds (the international interest rate), however, domestic providers will make these loans.
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But domestic availability of international collateral will not remain unchanged. In this environment, frictions in the market for domestic assets distort the private returns of 
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The basic model is easily extended to include a banking sector that replaces the domestic credit chains discussed above. For example, in order to capture a Mexican-style credit crunch, let banks make loans to firms funded at date 0 by issuing debt to foreigners. At date 1, domestic holders of international assets mortgage them and deposit the proceeds in the banking system that in turn intermediates new loans to distressed firms. Banks are subject to capital adequacy standards such that the ratio of the market value of capital to loans must be at least α. When banks are unconstrained, the economy is equivalent to that described above with perfect domestic financial markets and weak financial links.
Once adequacy standards bind, however, the supply curve for internal funds becomes backward bending as bank capital is eroded by higher interest rates that in turn lower asset prices.
Panel (a) of Figure 10 illustrates that this fire sale of assets may sharply reduce the banking sector's lending capacity, creating a credit crunch. Frictions in the banking sector are actually more serious than those described in undeveloped financial markets above.
Constrained banks become a financial bottleneck as excess domestic resources are not properly channeled to distressed firms, wasting otherwise good international collateral.
While the contraction in loan supply causes the increase in interest rates, the collapse in asset prices amplifies the impact of the crisis by deepening the credit crunch caused by If the private sector is doing the best the central planner could do, were it to face the same collateral (financial) constraints as the private sector does, then effective policy must seek to relax these constraints. Technically, in this case the decentralized equilibrium is constrained efficient, and the government can only improve things if it can move the economy from the second toward its first best. American economies are exposed to much larger short-term adjustment needs.
These are highly unlikely to be accommodated fully --and to a different degree in different countries--by exchange rate movements. 
IV. Policies to offset the private sector's underprovision
In addition to the previous policies, aimed at moving the economy toward its first best, one ought to ask: When and how should the government attempt to "force" the private sector to increase its international liquidity position?
From the perspective of the view portrayed in this paper, the answer to the "when" part of the question is: whenever the second ingredient ---domestic financial development---is present in a significant manner. In this case, the government will be trying to move the economy from a third to a second best. The main difficulty with the "how" part is that the government will not count with the "cooperation" of the private sector, as the latter will often attempt to offset any centralized international liquidity holding which puts the aggregate of this liquidity beyond that of the decentralized equilibrium without
intervention.
In what follows I give three examples ---with some of their perils---of policies aimed at depressing the private sector's bias against international liquidity hoarding.
i)
Sterilization. The quintessential monetary policy to deal with this international liquidity management problem, is a sterilized intervention -essentially, the central bank sells public bonds for international reserves -during the capital flows boom. The counterpart ought to be the selling back of these reserves during external crises. Experience and theory suggest that the first half of this policy, the sterilized intervention, is hard and expensive to implement for prolonged periods, and it may even backfire as the private sector reacts perversely to the quasi-fiscal deficit, appreciation, and reserves accumulation at the central bank. 25 Thus, this is
probably not an instrument that can be used for medium term prevention. F o r e ig n B a n k s D o m e s tic P r iv a te B a n k s B a n c o d e l E s ta d o F in a n c ia l S o c .
ii) Liquidity Ratios. A closely related measure that works mostly through controlling international liquidity aggregation within the country, is active management of bank reserves and capital adequacy ratios, and possibly international liquidity ratios. The model sketched above hints that the level of these ratios should be increasing with respect to the degree of underdevelopment of financial markets. In order to be effective in managing international liquidity intertemporally, these requirements must be procyclical. There are however two practical problems with such a recommendation, and hence may make this strategy less useful. First, for those countries where the health of the banking system is suspect, weakening standards at the time of crises may make a run more likely -this was a concern in Argentina during the recent crisis. Second, in other cases, especially when the participation of foreign banks is large, the policy may be ineffective during crises since the constraint may not be binding. Figure 11 shows the capital adequacy ratios for different segments of the Chilean banking sector; it is apparent that foreign banks voluntarily withdrew. While there is no doubt that fostering the arrival of solid international banks is a must, it is also important to understand the implications they may have for aggregate liquidity management. a) At the very least they should be made contingent on the availability of external flows, lowering them during external crises.
b) Since an important part of the volatility in capital flows seems to be caused by suppliers' problems (e.g. hedge funds), it may be worth considering requiring liquidity-ratios from them as well.
c) Also, the domestic "under-insurance" externality is likely to be more pronounced at the short end of the spectrum. Thus, controls should be biased toward reducing short-term capital flows. 26 Having said this, I must admit concern with the emerging "consensus" that developing economies have excessive short-term borrowing relative to their international reserves. At some level the claim is trivially right -it is impossible to have a liquidity crisis if the country holds more reserves than short-term debt and renewals. At another, figure 12 shows that emerging economies are much more prudent than developed ones along this margin. 27 Running an economy with all the precautions that "well-behaved" emerging economies do is extremely 
Notes: Data for 1997, except Norway data in panel (b) (1993). External debt for developed countries: BPS(IMF
